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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, i 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, S 
Respondent/Cross Appellant, i 
Case No. 880434-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the final order of the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy, Judge, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
affirming the Final Determination of the Executive Director of 
the Department of Health. 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1987). The appeal of the administrative 
hearing decision to the Third District Court was pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 26-23-2(3) (1987, Supp.). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In addition to the two issues Appellant Vali has 
presented for review regarding its claim for interest on the 
amount of a settlement between the parties# Respondent Department 
of Health, Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF) presents the 
following issue: 
Did the settlement that the parties orally 
agreed to on March 20, 1985 and confirmed in 
writing on March 22, 1985, bar, or otherwise 
render unenforceable, Vali's later claim for 
interest for the period prior to the 
settlement? 
A ruling in favor of DHCF on either the issues 
presented by Vali or on the issue presented by DHCF would dispose 
of the case and render consideration of the other issue(s) 
unnecessary. 
STATMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is Vali's attempt to get pre-settlement 
interest on the amount of a settlement between the parties, which 
amount was compromised, settled, and paid in full prior to 
initiation of litigation. At the time the underlying dispute 
arose, nursing homes in Utah were paid a certain number of 
dollars per patient per day by the Division of Health Care 
Financing (DHCF) for nursing home services provided to Medicaid 
recipients. The rates for each nursing home facility were 
calculated according to regulations of DHCF and were based 
principally on cost data supplied by each nursing home on its 
annual Facility Cost Profile (FCP). The nursing homes were paid 
monthly pursuant to the rates in effect. The rates were subject 
to adjustment on audit of the FCPs. 
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The underlying dispute arose when independent auditors 
found that Vali, a provider of Medicaid nursing home services, 
had significantly overstated its allowable costs on certain FCPs 
that Vali had submitted. Vali disagreed with the audit findings 
and requested an informal hearing, which commenced a rather 
lengthy series of conferences and meetings in an attempt to 
resolve differences and agree to a final settlement of the audit 
without the necessity of litigation in a formal administrative 
hearing. The parties reached a final compromised settlement 
agreement on or about March 22, 1985. The rates were adjusted 
and final settlement calculated. 
About two weeks after March 22, 1985, Vali raised the 
issue of interest for the first time. About a week later the 
parties met to discuss how the interest issue should be handled. 
At that meeting DHCF was informed by Vali that, in its opinion, 
the issue of interest had not been settled by the informal 
hearing. Vali was informed by representatives of DHCF that, in 
their opinion, the question of interest was settled by the 
informal hearing. The parties reached no agreement at that 
meeting except an agreement to disagree. Pursuant to the 
compromised settlement agreement of March 22, 1985, and without 
revoking its position that interest was settled by the informal 
hearing, DHCF thereafter tendered a check for the full settlement 
amount to Vali. Vali accepted the check and negotiated it, 
though Vali did not specifically rescind its contention that 
interest had not been settled. 
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Thereafter the dispute regarding interest was submitted 
to a formal administrative hearing officer who found in his 
recommended decision that Vali was entitled to interest. That 
decision was based largely on the Utah Procurement Code (Utah 
Code. Ann. S 63-56-1 et seq). The Executive Director of the 
Department of Health then entered her Final Determination holding 
in part that the statute relied on by Vali did not apply and that 
Vali was not entitled to interest. The matter was appealed to 
the Third District Court where the Final Determination of the 
Executive Director was affirmed. Vali no longer asserts that it 
is entitled to interest under the statute relied on by the 
Administrative Law Judge but continues to. assert that it is 
entitled to interest under two other statutes. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Respondent/Cross Appellant DHCF is the state agency 
responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program 
pursuant to Title XIX of the Federal Social Security Act. 
2. Appellant Vali was an owner and operator of nursing 
homes and provided nursing home services to Medicaid recipients 
at the time the original dispute arose. However, Vali sold its 
nursing homes prior to requesting an informal hearing and was not 
a Medicaid provider at the time the parties settled their dispute 
(R. 157) and Formal Hearing Transcript, p. 26 In 23. 
3. The Medicaid regulations require that within 90 
days after the close of each fiscal year every nursing home must 
file a report of its actual "allowable costs" for the fiscal 
year. That report is referred to as a Facility Cost Profile or 
4-
FCP. The Medicaid program specifies what costs are allowable. 
Medicaid State Plan, Attachment 4.19D S§ 330, 332, and 500 
(1979). 
4. The State Plan requires that M [unallowable costs 
should not be claimed on the FCPM, and that the provider "is 
primarily responsible for the accuracy and appropriateness of the 
reported information." Medicaid State Plan, Attachment 4.19D, S 
331 (1979). 
5. At the time this action arose, the allowable costs 
reported in a facilities FCP were used to determine that 
facility's per patient per day prospective payment rate for later 
periods. Medicaid State Plan, Attachment 4.19D, S 920 (1979). 
6. In December of 1979 or January of 1980, Vali 
submitted its long overdue FCPs for the period from January 1, 
1978 to June 30, 1978 (approximately 15 months late), and its 
slightly overdue FCP for the period of July 1, 1978 to June 30, 
1979 (approximately 3 months late). Stipulation of Facts, 
paragraph 1. 
7. Based on review of those FCPs, auditors of the 
independent accounting firm of Main Hurdman determined that a 
substantial portion of the costs reported on those FCPs were not 
"allowable costs" within the Medicaid program (R. 106). 
8. Because those FCPs were submitted late and because 
they contained disallowances, the Division of Health Care 
Financing (DHCF) was not able to use them at the time that it was 
necessary to calculate Vali's prospective payment rate. DHCF, 
therefore, calculated an interim rate that would be paid to Vali 
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until the audit was settled. The interim rate was based on past 
reports submitted by Vali's facilities, inflated forward (R. 
105). 
9. At such time as the dispute regarding the above-
mentioned FCP's could be settled, DHCF would then use the settled 
FCP's to recalculate the prospective payment rates regarding Vali 
and make any adjustments that might be necessary, whether it be 
for overpayments or for underpayments (R. 105). 
10. The Bureau of Medicaid Fraud, Department of Public 
Safety, undertook an investigation of Petitioner early in 1980. 
Stipulation of Facts, paragraph 2. 
11. Settlement negotiations between the parties in 
relation to disputed claims were stayed pending the conclusion of 
that investigation. Stipulation of Facts, paragraph 2. 
12. At the conclusion of that investigation, the 
Bureau of Medicaid Fraud determined that there was insufficient 
evidence to support criminal charges. Stipulation of Facts, 
Exhibit A. 
13. After the Medicaid Fraud investigation was 
completed on April 22, 1982, the Rate Reimbursement Specialist in 
the Department of Health recalculated the rates to be paid to the 
nursing homes that were operated by Vali, and informed Vali of 
those recalculations in letters that were sent to the facilities 
under dates of May 5, 1982 and May 10# 1982 (R. 141-148). 
14. Vali disagreed with the amounts and, almost a year 
later, on March 25, 1983 submitted its request for an informal 
administrative hearing (R. 157). 
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15. That hearing was scheduled for April 19, 1983. 
Pursuant to requests from Vali, the date of that hearing was 
rescheduled several times and was eventually held on July 28, 
1983 (R. 158-162). 
16. The total amount Vali claimed as allowable costs 
for its four nursing homes on the above-mentioned FCPs was 
approximately 3.9 million dollars. After months of negotiations 
between the parties in their efforts to resolve their dispute 
without formal litigation, the portion of that sum that continued 
to be disallowed was a little more than $768,000.00 (R. 166-171). 
17. The final session of the informal hearing took 
place on March 20, 1985. As a result of,that meeting the parties 
agreed that an additional $60,000.00 of the disallowance would be 
allowed, making the final disallowance a little more than 
$708,000 (R. 174) and Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit I. 
18. At that meeting the parties orally agreed to a 
proposed final settlement of their dispute. Uncontroverted 
evidence shows that at that meeting Mr. Brown (the principal of 
Vali) affirmed that the proposed settlement would "dispose of 
every claim which [he had] against the Health Department" and 
that he would go his way and the Department would go its way 
"without having to deal with each other over money again." 
Formal Hearing Transcript, Exhibit S-l Paragraph 5. 
19. After that meeting, the hearing officer put the 
terms that the parties had agreed to into written form (letter 
and attachments dated March 25, 1985), and proposed them for 
Vali's approval as final settlement. In the proposed settlement 
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the hearing officer stated, "I propose the following as final 
settlement in the Vali Care and Convalescent Centers issues." 
Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit H, p. 6, and Exhibit I. 
20. Mr. Brown (the principal of Vali) went to the 
Health Department and picked up that proposed settlement on March 
22, 1985. On that same day Mr. Brown confirmed, in writing, his 
acceptance of the Department's offer for final settlement by a 
letter in which he wrote: 
Mr. Don Hampton and I have reviewed the 
contents of your letters of March 18 and 25 
(picked up March 22) containing your 
findings as informal hearing officer of the 
Valley Care Center Audit review. 
Therein, you expressed a desire to expedite 
a final resolve in these matters; so too do 
we. Therefore, in an attempt to resolve 
without further discussion at the 
administrative hearing level; I am informing 
you of our decision to accept your findings 
as contained in the two (2) aforementioned 
letters. This settlement, while 
compromised, is a fair one and I appreciate 
your efforts in carrying it to this point. 
Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit K. 
21. About two weeks after the settlement agreement was 
entered into, Vali raised the issue of interest for the first 
time as the parties attempted to draft a mutual release. Formal 
Hearing Transcript, p. 83. 
22. On May 13, 1985, the parties met to discuss the 
issue of interest. Regarding that meeting, the Stipulation of 
Facts herein states: 
[at that] meeting. . . the DHCF was informed 
by the claimant that, in his opinion, the 
issue of interest had not been settled by 
the informal hearing. The claimant was 
informed by representatives of the DHCF 
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that, in their opinion, the question of 
interest was settled by the informal 
hearing. 
Stipulation of Facts, p. 4, paragraph 21. 
23. The parties left that meeting with the issue of 
interest unresolved and with nothing more than an agreement to 
disagree, each party holding fast to its respective position as 
stated in the Stipulation of Facts and agreeing only that the 
issue of whether interest was settled by the settlement agreement 
would have to be resolved through litigation. Formal Hearing 
Transcript, p. 22 et seq. 
24. Respondent thereafter delivered a check for the 
full settlement amount to Vali. Stipulation of Facts, p. 5, 
paragraph 23. 
25. Vali negotiated the check and filed a request for 
a formal hearing to resolve its claim regarding interest. 
Stipulation of Facts, p. 5, paragraphs 24 and 25. 
26. A hearing was held before an administrative law 
judge. The recommended decision of the administrative law judge 
was in favor of granting interest to Vali (R. 19-25). 
27. The record including the transcript of the 
hearing, the stipulation of facts, the exhibits, the briefs of 
the parties and the recommended decision of the administrative 
law judge was then forwarded to the Executive Director of the 
Department of Health for her review and final order. The 
Executive Director entered her Final Determination that Vali was 
not entitled to interest (R. 16-18). 
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28. Vali then appealed to the Third District Court. 
After extensive briefing and oral argument, that court entered 
its order affirming the Final Determination of the Executive 
Director that Vali is not entitled to interest (R. 229-237, 281-
283, 304-305). 
29. Vali then appealed to this Honorable Court and the 
Department of Health cross-appealed (R. 306-307, 313-314). 
RESPONSE TO VALI'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Form 271-A referred to in paragraph 1 of Vali's 
statement of Facts (hereinafter referred to as "Vali's Facts") is 
not an itemized statement "with fees for services" as Vali 
claims. Payment was not made on a fee for services basis but 
rather pursuant to an established rate per patient per day. Form 
271-A simply contained an itemized list of Medicaid recipients 
that resided in the facility during the month, the number of days 
they resided there, the level of care and rate they were entitled 
to, the total reimbursement the facility was entitled to (the 
applicable rate times the number of days in residence for each 
patient), the amount of the total reimbursement that would be 
paid by third party insurers, etc., and the amount of the total 
reimbursement that would be paid by Medicaid. Form 271-A is not 
a Facility Cost Profile (FCP). It is the FCPs that are the cause 
of the controversy herein. Since the record contains no evidence 
or contention to the contrary, it must be assumed that Vali 
submitted Form 271-A each month for each of its nursing homes and 
that Vali was timely paid each month pursuant to those Form 271-
A'e. 
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2. In response to paragraph 2 of Vali's Facts, the 
Facility Cost Profiles do not contain "fees for services" as 
claimed by Vali. Rather they contain the "costs" that Vali 
claimed were allowable costs based on the cost reimbursement 
manual. As indicated in DHCF's Statement of Facts, those costs 
were used to set the per patient per day rate for later periods, 
which rates were subject to adjustment after audit of the FCPs. 
3. In response to paragraph 3 of Vali's Facts, it is 
likely that under normal circumstances the audits, hearings, 
etc.; would have been completed by July 1, 1980 but contrary to 
Vali's suggestion, payment of the settlement amount would not 
have been made by that date because it would not have been due. 
The FCPs were used to calculate rates for later periods, as 
pointed out in DHCF's Statement of Facts. Furthermore, the 
reason circumstances were not normal was because Vali grossly 
overstated its claims. 
4. In response to paragraph 4 of Vali's Facts, the 
Bureau of Medicaid Fraud did not state that "there was no 
evidence to support any charges that VALI had filed false or 
inaccurate FCPs" (Emphasis added) as claimed by Vali. Rather the 
Bureau stated that there was "insufficient evidence to support 
criminal charges against Richard Brown or any of the principals . 
. . ." Exhibit A to Stipulation of Facts, emphasis added. As 
the Court is well aware, fraud can be one of the most difficult 
of criminal cases to prove. Evidence may be insufficient to 
support "criminal charges" for any of a number of reasons and yet 
the same evidence may still show wrongfulness, inaccuracies or 
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falsehood. Vali's claims as to the statement made by the Bureau 
of Medicaid Fraud are inaccurate, misleading and untrue. 
5. In paragraph 5 of Vali's Facts, Vali claims that 
the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud seized virtually every business 
document Vali possessed, that only part of those documents were 
returned and that those that were returned were in such disarray 
as to be virtually worthless without a major effort at 
reconstruction. In citing to the record, Vali cites the Third 
District Court's Memorandum Decision, as if to suggest that the 
Court had made such a finding. The Court did not make such a 
finding. Rather, after noting that Vali sought and received 
several extensions of time, the Court simply stated: "Vali 
suggests that the extensions were necessary as a result of the 
fraud investigators' disruption of its business documents." 
Memorandum Decision p. 2. Emphasis added. Hence the Court did 
not make such a finding but simply restated Vali's allegation. 
Furthermore, based on information supplied by the Bureau of 
Medicaid Fraud, the Department of Health would vigorously contest 
Vali's allegations that their documents were not returned or 
returned in disarray. (R. 8, paragraph 2.) 
Even if the alleged facts stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 
of Vali's Facts were true, they are irrelevant to Vali's case 
against the Department of Health. The Bureau of Medicaid Fraud 
is in the Department of Public Safety and the Department of 
Health has no control over the Department of Public Safety. 
Hence, Vali's cause of action, if any they have, should be 
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against the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud. 
6. In response to paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of Vali's 
Facts, Vali quotes the hearing officer out of context and 
conveniently drops the "However" from the original quote so that 
it would appear that there was a reservation of rights in the 
proposed settlement that would allow Vali to raise the interest 
question for the first time after the settlement proposal was 
accepted. The full quote immediately follows the settlement 
proposal and reads: 
Both parties in this issue have indicated 
that if they find this settlement 
satisfactory, they will accept settlement at 
the administrative hearing level. 
However, both parties reserved the right to 
raise any of the issues discussed in this 
hearing, or any related issues not 
necessarily discussed in the informal 
hearing level jLf_ the conflict cannot be 
resolved at the administrative review level. 
In oral argument in the District Court, Vali argued that it did 
not matter which Department it sued because ultimately the money 
comes from the State. But it does make a difference. The case 
Vali would have to prove against Medicaid Fraud is quite 
different than the case against the Department of Health. 
Moreover, each Department has its own separate budget. If 
Medicaid Fraud caused harm to Vali, then Medicaid Fraud should 
pay, not Health. Furthermore, since the Federal government 
reimburses the State for approximately 73% of the cost of 
Medicaid-covered medical services but does not reimburse the 
State for interest, if the State pays interest, they pay not only 
on State dollars but also on federal dollars. In addition, any 
money paid out to interest is not available for medical care. If 
it is not spent on medical care, the State also loses the Federal 
match that could have been claimed had the money been spent on 
medical care. The result is that for every $100,000.00 taken out 
of the Department of Health budget to pay interest, the State's 
Medicaid program loses about $370,370.00 that would otherwise be 
available to fund much needed medical care for the poor of our 
State. Hence it does make a difference which agency is sued. If 
the Department of Health ends up paying interest it is the 
medically needy poor who are the real losers. Vali's action, if 
any, should be against the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud. 
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Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit H, p. 9. Emphasis added. Hence 
the reservation of rights to raise issues applied only if the 
settlement proposal was not accepted. Since it was accepted, 
there was no reservation of rights. 
7. In paragraph 10 of Vali's Facts, Vali claims that 
as a resuit of the informal hearings and conferences a 
determination was made that Vali was "entitled" to a certain 
"principal" sum. The exhibit relied on by Vali in support of 
that claim makes no reference to Vali being entitled to anything 
or to a principal amount but rather sets forth ". . .calculations 
for the settlement. . ." and "The settlement results . . . " 
(Stipulation of facts paragraph 17 and accompanying exhibit). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the District Court, Vali argued that it had a 
statutory right to interest based upon any one of three specified 
Utah statutes. The Third District Court ruled against Vali on 
all three statutes. Vali's appeal is based on two of those 
statutes. The Department of Health's argument is simply that 
neither of the statutes relied on by Vali apply in this case. 
Though Vali has argued below that it does not seek 
interest as damages, Vali now asserts that it does seek interest 
as damages. The Department of Health argues that it is not 
permissible to raise a new issue on appeal and that even if it 
were permissible, the law provides that acceptance of the 
principal amount bars any claim for interest as damages. Vali 
did accept the full principal amount and is therefore barred from 
now claiming interest. 
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By way of cross-appeal, the Department of Health points 
out that the final settlement was the result of compromise 
between the parties. Moreover, the Department's proposal for 
settlement was, by its own terms, a proposal for final 
settlement. Vali did not reject the offer or even propose a 
counter offer but simply accepted the offer as written, i.e., as 
an offer for final settlement. Hence, Vali could not thereafter 
raise another claim. 
Furthermore, the compromised settlement agreement was 
binding on the parties and was substituted for the underlying 
claims. The compromise agreement barred any subsequent 
litigation on the underlying claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 15-1-1, UTAH CODE ANN. CREATES NO 
RIGHT OR ENTITLEMENT TO INTEREST; IT MERELY 
ESTABLISHES THE LEGAL RATE 
The first issue presented by Appellant in this appeal 
Is interest awardable under Utah Code Ann. 
S 15-1-1 where the principal sum due by 
contract is resolved by the parties without 
entry of formal judgment? 
Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1 states: 
(1) Except when parties to a lawful 
contract agree on a specified rate of 
interest, the legal rate of interest for the 
loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
Nothing in this section may be construed to 
in any way affect any penalty or interest 
charge which by law applies to delinquent or 
other taxes or to any contract or 
obligations made before May 14, 1981. 
15-
(2) The parties to a lawful contract may 
agree upon any rate of interest for the loan 
or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose 
in action. 
In its Minute Entry of May 11, 1988, the Third District 
Court, in this action, ruled: 
Section 15-1-1, Utah Code Ann., on its face 
creates no cause, claim, right or 
entitlement; it merely establishes the legal 
rate of interest. 
The correctness of the Court's ruling is verified by a 
brief examination of the legislative history of Section § 15-1-1, 
and by a close reading of that statute. Section 15-1-1 was first 
enacted in 1907. At that time the common law in Utah already 
provided for prejudgment interest as damages on amounts past due. 
Godbe v. Young, 1 U. 55 (No date listed); Perry v. Taylor, 1 U. 
63 (1871). Hence, S 15-1-1 did not create any new right or even 
codify an existing one. Rather, S 15-1-1 simply set the rate at 
which prejudgment interested would be assessed when a party had a 
common law right to prejudgment interest or when the parties had 
contracted for the payment of prejudgment interest but had not 
agreed upon a rate. 
A close reading of 15-1-1 will verify that this is 
true. There are no words requiring payment. The statute does 
not say "the debtor shall pay interest" or "the creditor is 
entitled to interest." Rather, it simply says "the legal rate of 
interest . • . shall be 10% per annum." The right to the 
interest is derived from the common law. The statute (S 15-1-1) 
simply sets the rate. 
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Since Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1 in and of itself creates 
no right or entitlement to interest, Vali is not entitled to 
interest under that statute. In order for Vali to be entitled to 
interest at the rate set by § 15-1-1, Vali would have to show 
that it is entitled to interest pursuant to principles of the 
common law. 
POINT II 
VALI CLAIMED BELOW THAT INTEREST WAS SOUGHT 
PURSUANT TO STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT AND NOT 
PURSUANT TO THE COMMON LAW. VALI CANNOT NOW 
CLAIM ENTITLEMENT TO INTEREST PURSUANT TO 
THE COMMON LAW, BUT EVEN IF IT COULD, THE 
COMMON LAW RULE OF EXTINGUISHMENT WOULD BAR 
VALI'S CLAIM. 
At the administrative hearing level, Vali argued that 
[s]ince interest is being sought pursuant to 
State statutes and not as general damages/ 
the general rule of extinguishment does not 
apply. 
Claimants Hearing Memorandum, p. 9 Emphasis added (R. 59). Thus, 
Vali did not seek interest based on a theory of damages. On the 
contrary, Vali specifically argued that it did not seek interest 
as damages but rather as an entitlement pursuant to certain State 
statutes, BO as to avoid application of the general rule of 
extinguishment. (That rule provides that when interest is 
claimed as damages, acceptance of the principal amount 
extinguishes any claim for interest and that a separate suit for 
interest as damages may not be maintained.) 
Statutory entitlement, of course, was also the basis of 
Vali's claim on appeal to the district court. Again, in framing 
its issues on appeal before this Honorable Court, Vali did not 
claim interest as damages but rather argued only that it was 
entitled to interest pursuant to State statutes. Indeed, the 
first time Vali claimed interest as damages was in response to 
DOH's Motion for Summary Disposition in this Honorable Court. 
The law in Utah is well settled that issues may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Develop. Co./ 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). Hence, Vali's 
untimely claim that it now seeks interest as damages should not 
even be considered by this Court. 
Moreover, even if Vali could now assert a claim for 
interest under the common law, it would not prevail because of 
the general rule of extinguishment. The law in Utah is clear 
that "[p]rejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as 
damages," L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Const. Co., Inc., 608 
P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980) and that 
where interest is payable merely as damages 
for nonpayment of money when due, acceptance 
of the principal amount bars any claim for 
interest. 
Cox Const. Co. v. State Road Comm., 583 P.2d 87 (Utah 1978). 
Moreover, the authority relied upon by the Cox court indicates 
that this is true even though the creditor receives the payment 
of principal, without interest, under protest. The rule barring 
separate claims for interest is further explained in Point III 
hereinafter. 
Since Vali did accept payment of the principal in full, 
Vali's claim for interest is barred and Vali cannot now maintain 
a separate action for interest. 
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POINT III 
THE CASES RELIED ON BY VALI IN POINT I OF 
ITS ARGUMENT ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT 
CASE AND DO NOT JUSTIFY VALI'S CLAIM FOR 
INTEREST UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1. 
The cases relied on by Vali in Point I of its Argument 
are easily distinguishable from the case at bar. One of the most 
significant differences is that none of the cases relied on by 
Vali involved a claim for interest on an amount that had been 
determined by a compromise between the parties. Rather, all of 
the cases relied on by Vali involved a claim for interest on 
either a principal amount that was uncontested or on the amount 
of a liability that had been determined by the Court. 
By way of contrast, payment of a compromised claim is 
payment of a claim of questionable validity and enforceability. 
Certainly, it would be unjust to assess interest on such a claim. 
Though Vali has the burden of proof, it has not cited one case 
where interest was claimed and ordered on a settlement amount 
that had been determined by a compromise between the parties. 
Indeed, it is highly doubtful that such a case exists, not only 
because of the manifest injustice of assessing interest on a 
questionable claim but also because when parties compromise and 
settle their disputes, the compromise agreement is substituted 
for the antecedent claim and the rights and liabilities of the 
parties are measured and limited by the terms of the compromise 
agreement, as is explained more fully hereinafter. 
In trying to justify its claim that interest should be 
paid on the settled amount, Vali points out that the law 
generally encourages settlements. Vali then seems to argue that 
-1 O . 
a ruling denying presettlement interest on the compromised amount 
would fly in the face of the well-settled principle of law that 
"settlements are favored in the law." Respondent asserts that 
quite the opposite is true. The only way to encourage 
settlements is to enforce them. If the Court were to allow a 
party to assert additional claims after a settlement had been 
agreed to, surely that would have a chilling effect. Certainly, 
there is disincentive to compromise and settle if a party must 
always wonder whether the opposing party will later assert a 
claim for interest. Moveover, a party would be disinclined to 
agree to pay a questionable claim if there was always the 
possibility that the other party could later hit him over the 
head with interest. 
If a claim for interest could be maintained after 
entering into a settlement, the only way for a party to protect 
himself from such uncertainty would be to inquire up front 
whether the other party would like to claim interest. Such would 
be not only unfair but would also fly in the face of the well-
settled principle that each party is responsible to assert its 
own claims. 
Moreover, if a claim for interest were made up front, 
prior to the settlement, it is quite possible that it would 
affect the extent to which the payor was willing to compromise 
the claim. Indeed, in the present case, Mr. Brown, Vali's 
principal, testified that he thought it would have been more 
difficult to get a settlement if interest had been included in 
the claim. Formal Hearing Transcript, p. 61, lines 1-6. 
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The law favors a policy of openness and honesty. When 
parties are negotiating a settlement, they should put all their 
demands on the table before the compromise is accepted• It is 
not only unlawful, it is also manifestly unfair to allow one 
party to impose an additional claim on the other after a 
settlement has been reached. 
Another difference between the two principal cases 
relied on by Vali and the present case is that, in those cases, 
the statutes relied upon by the courts specifically provided a 
right to interest instead of just setting the legal rate as does 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. In United States v. Consolidated 
Edison, 590 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y 1984), the Court relied on N.Y. 
Civ. Prac. Law S 5001 (McKinney 1963) which begins with the words 
"Interest shall be recovered . . . ." In Girard Trust Co. v. 
United States, 270 U.S. 163 (1926), the Court relied upon a 
United States statute that provided " . . . interest shall be 
allowed and paid upon the total amount of such a refund . . . .H 
42 Stat. 316 S 1324(a) (1921). Hence, the statutes relied on in 
both cases specifically provided a right to interest, whereas 
Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1 merely sets the legal rate. 
Con. Ed. and Girard are the only cases cited by Vali 
where a suit for interest was allowed after the principal had 
been paid. There is an additional distinction between those 
cases and the present case that is significant. 
As a general rule, if interest is due by the 
terms of the contract, the payment of the 
principal is no bar to its subsequent 
recovery, but if it is not due by the terms 
of the contract, the payment of the 
principal sum is a bar to recovery. 
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45 Am. Jur. 2d, Interest and Usury, S 341 p. 259. 
In finding that an action for interest could be 
maintained after payment of the principal, the Con. Ed. Court 
relied on that general rule, as evidenced by the following 
language the Con. Ed. court quoted from the Girard decision: 
[In Stewart] [t]his Court held that the 
taxpayer could not maintain an independent 
action for interest, for the reason that in 
such cases interest is considered as damages, 
does not form the basis of the action, and is 
only an incident to the recovery of the 
principal debt. We do not think that it 
controls this case. The payment of interest in 
the Stewart Case was not expressly provided for 
in the Act. In this case there is statutory 
provision for it, and it is analogous to a suit 
in debt or covenant in which the contract 
specifically provides for payment in interest 
on the principal debt. 
Con. Ed., p. 270. Emphasis added. Thus, in Con. Ed. and Girard, 
not only was the principal amount uncontested, there were also 
statutes that specifically provided for payment of interest. The 
Courts reasoned that those statutes were analogous to a contract 
that specifically provides for the payment of interest. 
Therefore payment of the principal would not bar a suit for 
interest. However, consistent with the general rule quoted 
above, the Courts also noted that it was a different situation 
than where interest was claimed as damages. 
In the present case, the amount of the payment was a 
compromised amount rather than an uncontested amount, the statute 
(Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1) does not specify a right to interest, 
and the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that prejudgment 
interest is damages, as pointed out at page 18 hereinabove. 
Hence, Girard and Con. Ed are inapplicable in the present case. 
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At page 11 of its brief, Vali states: 
In reliance upon § 15-1-1, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that, MIn contract cases, 
certainly, interest on amounts found to be due 
in judicial proceedings is recovery to which 
the creditor is entitled as a matter of law." 
Liqnell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979). 
Vali seems to suggest that the Court in Liqnell relied 
on S 15-1-1 in determining that the creditor was entitled to 
interest when in fact the Court relied on several cases, not on 
the statute, to establish that right. The Court did, however, 
reference S 15-1-1 as setting the legal rate. See Lignell, p. 
809. This, of course, is consistent with DHCF's argument as set 
forth above. Section 15-1-1 does not establish a right, but 
merely sets the rate. 
It should also be noted that the above-quoted language 
from Lignell, by its own terms, applies only to "interest on 
amounts found to be due in judicial proceedings." Lignell makes 
no reference to compromised claims. 
Moreover, application of the Lignell rule in the 
present case would not entitle Vali to recovery. If a party pays 
the principal in full, there is no principal owed, and the only 
amount that can be "found to be due in judicial proceedings" is 
zero. Of course, interest on a zero amount is itself zero. 
Citing Holmes v. Kewanne Oil Co., 664 P.2d 1335 (Kan. 
S. Ct. 1983), Vali claims that equitable principals would entitle 
Vali to interest "where a party retains and makes actual use of 
money belonging to another." Though that may be true, there is 
no evidence in the present case that the money was retained and 
used. Indeed, the evidence shows that 73% of the settled amount 
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was paid by the Federal Government. Furthermore, since the 
settlement amount was reached by compromise, it is questionable 
whether the money "belonged to another" until the settlement was 
agreed to. 
It should also be noted that prejudgment interest is 
denied where the claim is substantially inflated and a genuine 
dispute exists between the parties as to the amount due since the 
policy of the law is to discourage grossly inflated and 
overstated claims. Pappas v. Jack O.A. Nelsen Agency, Inc., 260 
N.W.2d 271 (Wis. 1978). As DHCF has previously pointed out, this 
whole dispute was caused by the grossly overstated claims on 
Vali's Facility Cost Profiles. Even the final disallowance was a 
whopping $708,000.00 on an allowed claim of about 3.2 million 
dollars. Hence, interest should not be allowed. 
POINT IV 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 15-6-1 DOES NOT APPLY 
BECAUSE THERE WAS A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES 
The second issue presented by Appellant in this appeal 
is: 
Is petitioner entitled to interest under the 
Utah Prompt Payment Act (Utah Code Ann. SS 
15-6-1 et seq.? 
The Prompt Payment Act (copy attached as Exhibit A) is 
an act providing for the payment of interest by the State on 
delinquent accounts. By its own terms, the Prompt Payment Act 
does not apply where there is a dispute as to the amount due. 
That act provides that if the agencies' failure to timely pay 
is the result of a dispute between the 
agency and the business over the amount due 
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or over compliance with the contract, the 
provisions of this act are inapplicable." 
Utah Code Ann. S 15-6-4 (1986 Replacement). Hence, in this 
action, the Third District Court ruled, at page five of its 
Memorandum Decision of February 11, 1988, that the Prompt Payment 
Act 
is limited by Section 15-6-4, which renders the 
interest provisions inapplicable if the failure 
to timely pay is the result of a dispute. 
There was here a dispute . . . Section 15-6-3 
is therefore inapplicable. 
Vali has argued that there is no dispute in this case 
and that the Act therefore applies. Such a position is 
untenable. 
When Vali submitted its FCPs in December 1979, those 
i CPs were Vali's claims as to what expenses it claimed were 
allowable Medicaid expenses for the purpose of setting Vali's 
prospective payment rate. Upon the recommendation of the 
independent auditors who reviewed those FCPs, DHCF disputed the 
amount claimed and disallowed a substantial portion of the amount 
claimed. Had there been no dispute, DHCF would not have made a 
disallowance but would simply have accepted the figures Vali 
claimed in its FCPs and used those figures in calculating Vali's 
prospective payment rate. There would have been no need for the 
months of conferences and hearings. DHCF, however, did not 
accept those figures. Rather, they disputed the amount claimed 
by Vali. 
On page 19 of Vali's Brief, Vali seems to infer that 
the Administrative Law Judge (MALJ") considered the applicability 
of the Prompt Payment Act and determined that there was "no 
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legitimate dispute" and that the Department's interpretation of 
what constitutes a dispute is "clearly unreasonable." Vali's 
argument is misleading. The ALJ did not even mention the 
applicability of the Prompt Payment Act in his findings, 
conclusions and recommended decision. The ALJ's decision was 
based principally on the Procurement Code (Utah Code Ann. § 63-
56-1, et seq.), which the Third District Court found does not 
apply in this case, and which finding Vali did not appeal to this 
Court. Furthermore, the Procurement Code (the statute relied on 
by the ALJ) has no "dispute" provision. Hence, the issue of 
whether there was a dispute was not even considered by the ALJ. 
There clearly was a dispute between the parties. As 
mentioned above, the informal hearing officer's proposed 
settlement stated: 
Both parties in this issue have indicated that 
if they find this settlement satisfactory, they 
will accept settlement at the administrative 
hearing level. However, both parties reserved 
the right to raise any of the issues discussed 
in this hearing, or any related issues not 
necessarily discussed in the informal hearing 
level if the conflict cannot be resolved at the 
administrative review level. 
Moreover, when the owner of Vali accepted the proposed 
settlement, he wrote: "[T]his settlement, while compromised, is 
a fair one and I appreciate your efforts in carrying it to this 
point." Statement of Facts herein, paragraph 18. 
Were there no dispute, there would be no need for a 
settlement. Were there no dispute, there would be nothing to 
compromise. Furthermore, the fact that both parties reserved the 
right to contest any of the issues if the hearing officer's 
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settlement proposal was not accepted, is evidence that all issues 
remained in dispute right up until the settlement proposal was 
accepted in March of 1985. Most significantly, the very fact 
that Vali compromised and settled the FCP's for over seven 
hundred thousand dollars less than it originally claimed, and 
called the settlement Ma fair one", is sufficient evidence by 
itself that there was a dispute. 
This case is simply not the type of case to which the 
Prompt Payment Act applies. The intent of that Act is to ensure 
that the state agencies make timely payment of undisputed claims. 
That Act clearly applies only in those situations where there is 
no dispute as to the amount due and where the state agency is 
simply delinquent in making payment of an uncontested amount. 
When there is a dispute, a party may still seek interest under 
the Procurement Code or pursuant to the common law, if either are 
applicable, but the Prompt Payment Act does not apply. 
There was a dispute in the present case and the Prompt 
Payment Act is therefore inapplicable. 
POINT V 
THE SETTLEMENT ENTERED INTO BT THE PARTIES 
BARS VALI'S CLAIM FOR INTEREST. 
After months of negotiations between the parties in 
their efforts to resolve their dispute without formal litigation, 
the final session of the informal hearing took place on March 20, 
1985. At that meeting, the parties orally agreed to terms for 
final settlement of their dispute. Uncontroverted evidence shows 
that at that meeting, Mr. Brown (the principal of Vali) affirmed 
that the proposed settlement would "dispose of every claim which 
-27-
[he had] against the Health Department" and that he would go his 
way and the Department would go its way "without having to deal 
with each other over money again." Formal Hearing Transcript, 
Exhibit S-l, paragraph 5. 
After that meeting, the hearing officer put the terms 
to which the parties had agreed into written form and proposed 
them for Vali's approval as final settlement. In that typed copy 
of the settlement agreement, the hearing officer stated: "I 
propose the following as final settlement in the Vali Care and 
Convalescent Center's issues." Formal Hearing Transcript, 
Exhibits H & I, p. 6. Emphasis added. The hearing officer then 
set forth the terms and concluded "[i]f, as we discussed [the 
settlement] is satisfactory to you, I would appreciate a letter 
to that effect so we can begin the process of adjusting the rates 
and generate a final warrant." Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit 
"I". Emphasis added. 
Mr. Brown picked up the hearing officer's proposal for 
final settlement at the Health Department on March 22, 1985. On 
that same day, Mr. Brown confirmed, in writing, his acceptance of 
the Department's offer for final settlement by a letter in which 
he wrote: 
Mr. Don Hampton and I have reviewed the 
contents of your letters of March 18 and 25 
(picked up March 22) containing your findings 
as informal hearing officer of the Valley Care 
Center audit review. 
Therein, you expressed a desire to expedite a 
final resolve in these matters' so too do we. 
Therefore, in an attempt to resolve without 
further discussion at the administrative 
hearing level; I am informing you of our 
decision to accept your findings as contained 
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in the two (2) aforementioned letters. This 
settlement, while compromised, is a fair one 
and I appreciate your efforts in carrying it to 
this point. 
Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit HKM. Emphasis added. 
Thus, on March 20, 1985, the parties had agreed orally 
to a settlement, and that oral agreement was confirmed in writing 
by both parties on March 22, 1985. 
Moreover, the parties do not even contest whether there 
was a settlement agreement of some sort. Indeed, Petitioners 
argue that settlements are favored by the law. The only real 
disagreement between the parties is whether their settlement also 
settled the question of interest. 
The law is well settled that an offer of settlement 
must be accepted on the terms in which the offer is made. 
Watters v. Hedqpeth, 90 S.E. 314, 172 N.C. 310 (1916). That, of 
course, is not surprising. It is a basic principle of contract 
law. When one party makes an offer, the other party may either 
accept the offer, make a counter offer, or reject the offer. 
The hearing officer's proposal, as quoted above, was a 
proposal for final settlement. Mr. Brown had the option to 
accept that offer on the terms in which it was made (i.e. as 
final settlement), to reject the offer, or to make a counter 
offer. He did not reject. Nor did he make a counter offer. He 
simply accepted the offer as written,. Thus, the parties had 
entered an agreement for final settlement, and Mr. Brown had even 
indicated that the settlement, while compromised, was a fair one. 
As Vali has pointed out, the law favors settlement. It 
favors the finality of settlements. Holler v. Wallis, 573 P.2d 
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1302 (Wash. 1978). Hence, Vali could not raise a new issue after 
accepting the hearing officer's proposal for final settlement. 
Another reason that Vali is not entitled to interest 
for the period preceding the settlement agreement is that: 
[a] valid compromise and settlement is final, 
conclusive, and binding upon the parties . . . 
and, regardless of what the actual merits of 
the antecedent claim may have been, they will 
not afterward be inquired into and examined . . 
The compromise agreement is substituted for the 
antecedent claim or right, and the rights and 
liabilities of the parties are measured and 
limited by the terms of the agreement. The 
antecedent claim is extinguished, and 
subsequent litigation based upon it is barred 
by the compromise and settlement. 
15a Am Jur 2d Compromise and Settlement §§ 24, 25. 
Hence, because the settlement agreement extinguishes 
the prior agreement and because the rights and liabilities of the 
parties are determined by the settlement agreement, even if the 
Court were to rule that the settlement agreement herein settled 
only the principal amount, Vali would still be entitled to 
interest on the settlement amount only from the date payment of 
the settlement amount was due up to and including the date it was 
paid. 
The earliest that the settlement amount herein was due 
was April 5, 1985 (the date the parties' accountants agreed on 
the calculations). The record shows that the Department did pay 
interest on the settlement amount from that date up to the date 
when payment of the settled amount was made on May 16, 1985. 
Vali has no other enforceable claim for interest. 
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CONCLUSION 
Vali raised two issues on appeal, namely: 
1. Whether interest is awardable under Utah Code Ann. 
S 15-1-1 where the principal sum due by contract is resolved by 
the parties without entry of a formal judgment; and 
2. Whether petitioner is entitled to interest under 
the Utah Prompt Payment Act (Utah Code Ann. SS 15-6-1, et seq.), 
under the facts of this case. 
As set forth above, S 15-1-1 in and of itself creates 
no right or entitlement to interest, but rather merely sets the 
rate that applies when there is a right to interest pursuant to 
common law principles regarding prejudgment interest, and § 15-6-
1 et seq. does not apply in this case because there was a dispute 
between the parties. Since neither statute relied upon by Vali 
is applicable, Vali's appeal must fail. 
Though Vali's claim for interest under the common law 
is not timely and should not be considered by this Court, even if 
it was timely, it would not entitle Vali to interest since the 
well-settled rule of the common law provides that where interest 
is sought pursuant to the common law rather than by a specific 
contract right, a separate action for interest may not be 
maintained and acceptance of the principal bars any claim for 
interest. 
Furthermore, because the parties compromised their 
claims and entered a settlement agreement, Vali is only entitled 
to interest from the time of the settlement to the time of 
payment, which interest has already been paid to Vali. 
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Settlements are favored in the law. The settlement between the 
parties ought to be enforced and no further claims allowed. 
For the many reasons cited above, but especially 
because Vali has no right to interest under the statutes it 
relies on, Vali's appeal must fail* DHCF respectfully requests 
that the Final Determination of the Executive Director of the 
Department of Health be affirmed, as was done by the Third 
District Court, and that the relief requested by Vali be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of March, 1989. 
BRIAN L. FARR 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Julia C. Attwood 
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Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
185 South State, Suite 700 
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EXHIBIT A 
EXHIBIT A 
PROMPT PAYMENT ACT i 15-5-8 
History: L. 1929, ch. 91, | 6; R.8.1933 4 C. 
1943, 4744. 
15-4-6. Death of joint obligor — Survivorship. 
On the death of a joint obligor in contract his executor or administrator 
shall be bound as such jointly and aeverally with the surviving obligor or 
obligors. 
Hiftory: L. 1929, ch. 61,1 * R.6.1933 * C. 
1943, 4744. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. id. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts will, made pursuant to agreement at to disposi-
I 301. tion of property at death, to dispose of such 
CJS. — 17A CJ.S. Contract* f 353. property during life, 85 A.L.R 3d 8. 
AX.R. — Right of party to joint or mutual Key Numbers. — Contracts e» 182(2). 
15-4-7. Effective date of chapter. 
This chapter shall not apply to obligations arising prior to July 1, 1929. 
History: L. 1929, ch. 61,1 7; KB. 1933 * C. 
1943, 47-0-7. 
CHAPTER 5 
REVOLVING CHARGE AGREEMENTS 
(Repealed by Law. 1969, ch. 18, ft 9.103) 
15-5-1 to 15-5-8. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section* 15-5-1 to 15-5-8 (L. charge agreement*, were repealed by Law* 
1965. eh 26, ft 1 to 8). relating to revolving 1969, ch. 18, I 9.103. 
CHAPTER 6 
PROMPT PAYMENT ACT 
Section Section 
16-6-1. Short title. 1*4-4. Disputed payment* excepted. l
^fl Time for payment by 9UW ejendee. l iV«. Contrscton'psymenU to suboontrex-
16-&-3. Interest on payment* by eute afen-
 | o r f _ T i m t _ latest 
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15-6-1 CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
15-6-1. Short tide. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Utah Prompt Payment 
Act-
History: L. 1983, ch. 300, I 1. 1983. ch. 300, which enacted this section and 
Meaning of "this act**. — The term "this | | 15-6-2 to 15-6-5. 
act," referred to in this section, refers to Laws 
15-6-2. Time for payment by state agencies. 
(1) An agency of the state of Utah which acquires property or services 
pursuant to a contract with a business shall pay for each complete delivered 
item of property or service on the date required by contract between such 
business and agency or, if no date for payment is specified by contract, within 
60 days after receipt of the invoice covering the delivered items or services. 
(2) The acquisition of property includes the rental of real or personal prop-
erty. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 300, I 1. 
15-6-3. Interest on payments by state agencies. 
(1) Interest shall accrue and be charged on payments overdue under 
§ 15-6-2 at the rate of 15.5% per annum beginning on the day after payment 
is due, if the payment due date is specified by contract, or on the 61st day after 
receipt of the invoice, if no payment date is specified by contract. Interest 
ceases to accrue on the date payment is made. 
(2) Any interest which remains unpaid at the end of any 60-day period or 
which remains unpaid at the end of any specified period provided by contract 
shall be added to the principal amount of the debt and shall thereafter accu-
mulate interest. 
(3) An agency of the state is prohibited from seeking additional appropria-
tions to pay interest which accrues as a result of an agency's failure to make 
payments as required by 5 15-6-2. 
History: L 1983, ch. 300, • 3. 
15-6-4. Disputed payments excepted. 
If the agency's failure to timely pay interest as required by I 15-6-3 is the 
result of a dispute between the agency and the business over the amount due 
or over compliance with the contract, the provisions of this act are inappli-
cable. 
History: L. IMS, ch. 300, I 4. 
Meaning of "this act". — Set ths nots un-
der this catchlin* under I 15-6-1. 
758 
REGISTERED PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS ACT 15-7-2 
15-6-5. Contractors9 payments to subcontractors — Time 
— Interest 
Upon payment by an agency of the state of Utah or by an agency of the 
United States, a business which has acquired under contract, property or 
services in connection with its contract with such an agency from a subcon-
tractor or supplier, shall pay such subcontractor or supplier within 30 days 
after payment from such agency. Interest at the rate of 15.5% per annum shall 
accrue and is due any subcontractor or supplier who is not paid within 45 days 
after the business receives payment from the agency, unless otherwise pro-
vided by contract between the business and the subcontractor or supplier. 
Interest begins to accrue on the 31st day at the rate specified in this subsec-
tion. 
History: L. 1963, ch. S00, I 6. 
CHAPTER 7 
REGISTERED PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS 
ACT 
Section 
15.7-1. 
15-7-2. 
15-7-3. 
15-7-4. 
15-7-5. 
15-7-6. 
15-7-7. 
15-7-S. 
15-7-9. 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Purpose. 
Registration system established by 
issuer. 
Execution of obligation*. 
Signature* of officer*. 
Seal*. 
Agent* of iaauer. 
Transfer cost* — Agreements as to 
payment of costs. 
Section 
15-7-10. 
15-7-11. 
15-7-12. 
15-7-13. 
15-7-14. 
Investment of public funds in regis-
tered obligations of public enti-
ties of other states. 
Registration records — Public in-
spection — Location. 
Obligations subject to chapter. 
Construction with other law. 
Covenant against repeal of chapter. 
15-7-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Registered Public Obliga-
tions Act." 
History: L. 1983, eh. 62, | 1. 1983, ch 62, which enacted this section and 
Meaning of "this set". — The term "this | | 16-7-2 to 15-7-14. 
act," referred to in this section, refers to Laws 
15-7-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Authorized officer" means any individual required or permitted by 
any law or by the issuing public entity to execute on behalf of the public 
entity, a certificated registered public obligation or a writing relating to 
an uncertificated registered public obligation. 
(2) "Certificated registered public obligation" means a registered pub-
lic obligation which is represented by an instrument 
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